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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

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Guidelines for Use of Public Presentation Package

The Public Presentation Package on LRTNF issues consists of three separate sections:

I. "Modernization and Arms Control for Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces" -- a short, relatively basic, rationale for LRTNF modernization/arms control in the context of NATO's strategy of flexible response.

II. "Trends in Soviet and NATO Nuclear Forces," including 7 figures and 2 fact sheets on long-range theater missiles and bombers -- this section provides the basic set of unclassified data for the analysis of LRTNF issues.

III. "Package of Q's and A's Concerning TNF Modernization/Arms Control" -- a set of Q's and A's, grouped according to principal themes, that cover likely questions concerning TNF.

The Public Presentation Package is unclassified. It has been provided to American embassies in NATO countries for distribution to host governments for their use as they deem appropriate.

At this time we are not planning widespread distribution of this material within the United States. Sections I and II are designed to provide the material on which to draw on appropriate occasions with the press and public and to serve as a briefing memorandum. The Q's and A's should not be distrubted and are intended to serve only as supporting material for US government spokesmen.

We would appreciate any recommendations for additional questions or subjects that should be addressed. This version of the Public Presentation Package represents our first effort and could be amended as discussion of this issue developes. Please forward any suggestions to Dr. Clark Murdock, 697-4823.

MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL FOR LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

NATO'S basic strategy is flexible response. The strategy is designed to enable NATO to make an appropriate response to any level of initial action by an aggressor, from demonstrations of force to full-scale hostilities. The NATO response may initially be at the same level as the provocation, but could escalate as necessary. The ability to meet any level of threat commensurately or at a higher level of response serves to deter an aggressor from any level of initial action.

To the extent that NATO has this flexible response capability, our deterrent will be credible. It can convince the Soviets that no matter what military action they may take, the West can meet them by a response effective at that level of conflict and that Soviet action risks escalation to higher levels of violence which carry costs far outweighing any possible benefits that could be expected from continuing their aggression. Thus, NATO'S strategy of flexible response necessitates a military force structure which clearly shows our potential adversaries that we have a wide range of options to influence the course of conflict.

The recent buildup in Soviet long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF) --systems which can strike Western Europe from the Soviet Union -- represent a challenge to NATO's strategy. The introduction of the SS-20 Missile and Backfire bomber significantly increase Soviet capabilities both qualitatively by improving accuracy, range and survivability, and quantitatively by adding to deliverable warheads in this class of systems. In contrast, NATO, since the early 1960's, has chosen to deploy many fewer long-range theater nuclear weapons than the Soviets and has not in recent years modernized its capabilities.

During the era of US strategic superiority, there was little concern in NATO about Soviet advantages in these theater systems. Facing the vastly superior US intercontinental nuclear forces, the Soviets could expect that any action they took with long-range theater nuclear forces in Europe would evoke a response from the US strategic forces.

Over the past few years, the Soviet Union has reached a state of parity with the United States in intercontinental nuclear forces. This condition in no way diminishes the likelihood that US strategic forces would be used to defend Europe -- US vital interests are too engaged, its commitments are too strong, and its ties are too deep for it to be otherwise.

Despite this, the combination of strategic parity and the Soviet buildup of LRTNF does pose a serious question -- could the Soviet Union, possessing intercontinental forces equivalent to those of the United States, attack Western Europe under the mistaken belief that the Soviet homeland was safe from nuclear retaliation? The Soviet Union might calculate that it could escape attack from US intercontinental forces because the US would be held in check by the balance in US-Soviet intercontinental forces and that long-range theater nuclear forces in Europe capable of striking the Soviet Union did not constitute a significant deterrent. Consequently, NATO's strategy of flexible response, in the view of the Soviet Union, could appear to be flawed. The Soviets could think that there was a scenario for military victory in Europe in which they could use, or threaten to use, their nuclear forces and for which NATO had no response. NATO must disabuse the Soviets of any such line of thinking. Thus, the issue before us is how best to do that.

Our preference, of course, would have been that the Soviet Union had not embarked upon its buildup of theater nuclear forces, including the SS-20 and Backfire bomber. Unfortunately we are faced with the fact that the Soviets are continuing the expansion and modernization of their TNF without let up.

In the face of this Soviet buildup, it seems clear that the Alliance will have to undertake some level of modernization of its LRTNF if it does not want to run the risk of encouraging Soviet misperceptions about our capabilities, which could ultimately weaken deterrence and increase the risk of war. At the same time, we want to persuade the Soviets of the futility of attempting to gain an overwhelming advantage in this category of systems. By so doing, we will maintain the undiminished security of the Alliance while enhancing political and military stability in Europe.

To that end, the Alliance is considering a dual approach of theater nuclear force modernization and arms control. LTRNF modernization would replace aging weapons systems with highly survivable and more capable systems, thereby enhancing considerably the credibility of NATO's LRTNF options. LRTNF modernization would also signal the Soviet Union that the Alliance has the will and determination to respond to its challenge and that the Soviet LRTNF buildup has no prospect of securing military or political advantages for the USSR. This demonstration of NATO's resolve will help convince the Soviet Union that its interests would be better served by restraint and the serious pursuit of arms control, and not by a unilateral buildup of military capabilities.

In line with NATO's basic policy of deterrence, defense and detente, and in order to avoid a needless arms race, the Alliance has given special consideration to the role arms control can play in contributing to a more stable military relationship between East and West, and in advancing the process of detente. The Alliance regards arms control as an integral part of its efforts to assure the undiminished security of its member states by making the strategic situation more stable, more predictable and more manageable, as well as by seeking lower levels of nuclear weapons inventories on both sides. In this fundamental sense, arms control and defense efforts are complementary means of achieving the same ends.

Consequently, NATO is examining arms control negotiations involving TNF in parallel with LRTNF modernization. Both NATO and Warsaw Pact security could be enhanced through meaningful agreements. Realistically, it is highly unlikely that the Soviet Union would accept significant constraints on their systems in the absence of tangible programs on the part of NATO. Therefore, NATO must proceed with its modernization program, the scale of which can be affected by the willingness of the Soviet Union to enter into serious arms control agreements. However, since the Soviets have already modernized and expanded substantial parts of their long-range theater nuclear forces, some NATO modernization would be necessary even if arms control

In summary, the Alliance is considering two parallel and complementary approaches -- the modernization of NATO's long-range theater nuclear forces and the limitation of theater nuclear forces through arms control negotiations. These dual approaches are designed to ensure the security of NATO while at the same time providing the Soviet Union with incentives to constrain its programs and move toward a more stable political and military situation in Europe. Such an integrated approach to modernization and arms control would permit the alliance to avert an arms race in the European theater caused by the Soviet buildup, and preserve the viability of NATO's objectives of deterrence, defense and detente.

TRENDS IN SOVIET AND NATO NUCLEAR FORCES

The projected size and character of Soviet SS-20 and Backfire deployments appear to exceed purely defensive needs and raise the possibility that the Soviet Union is pursuing offensive capabilities. The theater nuclear systems they are now deploying are far more capable than previous Soviet systems. Furthermore, the most threatening of these systems -- the SS-20 -- is not constrained by SALT II or other arms control agreements. (The maximum rate of Backfire production is limited under SALT II.) The Alliance must decide how to respond to maintain the credibility and effectiveness of NATO's deterrence forces.

A NATO decision to modernize its LRTNF would not increase NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons in its overall strategy, nor alter the policy of relying on US intercontinental nuclear forces as the ultimate deterrent against Soviet aggression. The role of LRTNF will continue to be an important element of the spectrum of deterrence and an essential component of the NATO strategy of flexible response.

Past Trends and Current Capabilities

As illustrated by Figure 1, the number of US strategic nuclear delivery vehicles increased in the mid-1960's and

then leveled off. During this period of growth in intercontinental systems, however, the US reduced its European-based nuclear systems capable of striking the Soviet Union (Fig. 2). NATO maintained its modest level of LRTNF by deploying US F-111S and UK Vulcans. British Polaris SLBMs and some US Poseidon SLBMs are committed to NATO in the event of crisis and would contribute significantly to its forces. French systems (Mirage, IRBMs and SLBMs) are not assigned to NATO but unquestionably contribute to overall Alliance deterrence. But the British and French forces are not large in relation to the overall nuclear balance currently measured in thousands of deliverable warheads.

During the time that US and NATO nuclear force structures stabilized, the Soviet Union began increasing its strategic missile force capable of hitting targets both in the US and in Europe, and retained, and then modernized, its missile and bomber forces directed against Western Europe (Figures 3 and 4). As can be seen in Figure 4, significant improvements in the Soviet's LRTNF capability began as early as 1974 with the introduction of the Backfire bomber. In 1977, the Soviet Union began to modernize its theater missile capability with the deployment of the SS-20.

Projected Soviet Improvements

The LRTNF buildup undertaken by the Soviets is increasing the quantitative and qualitative threat to NATO. As can be seen in Figure 5, the Soviet Union may not continue increasing the number of launchers as they did during the last half of the 1970's -- in fact their number may decrease slightly as they phase out older systems (assuming, which is not certain, that SS 4/5s and older Soviet bombers will be retired at currently projected rates). Modernization, however, will result in a significant increase in the number of warheads which can be targeted on Western Europe (Figure 6). This increase stems largely from the improved systems characteristics of the SS-20: its three warheads and multiple refire capability (that is, lauchers that can be reloaded once their initial missile is fired).

In addition to the quantitative increase in deliverable warheads, Soviet LRTNF has improved qualitatively as well. As can be seen in Figure 7, the SS-20 represents a considerable advance over the older SS-4s and 5s: in addition to its increased range, the SS-20 is three times more accurate than the SS-5 and six times more accurate than the SS-4; it carries three warheads while the older systems carry only one; and it is the only mobile missile of the three, thus increasing significantly its survivability. The Backfire has a greater

range than either the Badger or the Blinder, and its ability to fly at high subsonic speeds at low altitudes increases its survivability and its ability to penetrate under combat conditions.

NATO's Future Plans

Since the deployment of US F-111s to the UK in 1970, NATO has not introduced any new long-range theater nuclear systems (though the number of F-111s was increased in 1977). Essentially, NATO's LRTNF in the 1980's would look like our current force unless NATO modernizes. Continued Soviet deployments of SS-20s and Backfires, however, will further reduce the survivability of elements of NATO's LRTNF. Warsaw Pact defensive improvements will also affect the ability of some of NATO's LRTNF to penetrate Soviet territory. Failure to respond to Soviet deployments increases the risk that the Soviets might believe -- however incorrectly -- that they could use long-range forces to make or threaten nuclear strikes against Western Europe from a "sanctuary" in the Soviet Union, in the misperception that without strong NATO theater based systems capable of reaching Soviet territory, and in an era of parity at the intercontinental nuclear level, NATO lacked credible and appropriate means of response.

FIGURE 1

US STRATEGIC FORCES



1/ NUMBER OF TUBES ON US POLARIS AND POSEIDON SSBN. INCLUDED IN THIS CATEGORY ARE THE SLBM DEDICATED TO SACEUR

2/ NUMBER OF ATLAS, TITAN AND MINUTEMAN MISSILES

3/ NUMBER OF B-47 AND B-52 BOMBERS, EXCLUDING B-47's BASED IN EUROPE

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FIGURE 2

NATO LONG RANGE THEATER FORCES



1/ NUMBER OF B-47's BASED IN ENGLAND, SPAIN, AND NORTH AFRICA
2/ NUMBER OF THOR MISSILES IN EUROPE
3/ NUMBER OF JUPITER MISSILES IN EUROPE
4/ NUMBER OF F-111's IN EUROPE
5/ NUMBER OF VULCANS (UK)

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FIGURE 3

SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCE



1/ TOTAL SLBM TUBES ON ACTIVE SUBMARINES
2/ TOTAL NUMBER OF BEAR AND BISON BOMBERS
3/ CUMULATIVE TOTALS OF SS-7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 17, 18 AND 19

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FIGURE 4

SOVIET LONG-RANGE THEATER SYSTEMS



1/ NUMBER OF SLBM TUBES DIRECTED AGAINST NATO
2/ NUMBER OF SS-4 AND SS-5 LAUNCHERS OPPOSITE NATO
3/ NUMBER OF SS-20 LAUNCHERS OPPOSITE NATO
4/ NUMBER OF BADGER AND BLINDER AIRCRAFT OPPOSITE NATO (NOT INCLUDING NAVAL VERSIONS)
5/ NUMBER OF BACKFIRE BOMBERS OPPOSITE NATO (NOT INCLUDING NAVAL VERSIONS)

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FIGURE 5

TOTAL LRTNF DELIVERY VEHICLES, SOVIET VS NATO



1/ SLBM (TUBES DIRECTED AGAINST NATO), SS-4/5 (LAUNCHERS OPPOSITE NATO), BADGER/BLINDER (AIRCRAFT AGAINST NATO) -- ASSUMES CURRENT RATES OF RETIREMENT

2/ SS-20 (LAUNCHERS OPPOSITE NATO), BACKFIRE (BOMBERS OPPOSITE NATO)

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FIGURE 6

TOTAL LRTNF WARHEADS, SOVIET VS NATO



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FIGURE 7

SOVIET QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS

	SS-4	SS-5	SS-20
MIRVing	1 RV EACH	1 RV EACH	3 RVs EACH
VULNERABILITY	FIXED SITES	FIXED SITES	MOBILE, HIGHLY SURVIVABLE
RATIO OF ACCURACY 1/	6	3	1
REFIRE CAPABILITY	YES 2/	YES 2/	YES
RANGE	1900 KM	4100 KM	4400 KM

1/ THE SS-20 IS THREE TIMES AS ACCURATE AS THE SS-5 AND SIX TIMES AS ACCURATE AS THE SS-4.

2/ THOSE SS-4's AND SS-5's THAT ARE DEPLOYED IN HARDENED SILOS DO NOT HAVE A REFIRE CAPABILITY; THOSE DEPLOYED IN "SOFT" SITES DO.

	BADGER	BLINDER	BACKFIRE
RADIUS 1/	2800 KM	3100 KM	4200 KM
SPEED	SUBSONIC	SUPERSONIC AT HIGH ALTITUDES; SUBSONIC AT LOW ALTITUDES.	SUPERSONIC AT HIGH ALTITUDES; HIGH SUBSONIC AT LOW ALTITUDES.

1/ FOR BADGER AND BLINDER, THE RADIUS USED IS UNDER A SUBSONIC HIGH-HIGH-HIGH MISSION PROFILE. FOR BACKFIRE, THE PROFILE IS A SUBSONIC HIGH-LOW-LOW-HIGH.

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FACT SHEET FOR SELECTED LONG RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS -- MISSILES

THE SOVIET UNION'S SS-20 IS A TWO-STAGE, SOLID-PROPELLANT INTERMEDIATE RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE. THE MISSILE IS COMPRISED OF THE LOWER TWO STAGES OF THE SS-16 ICBM, A POST-BOOST VEHICLE (PBV) AND MIRVS.

THE US SOLID-PROPELLANT PERSHING II, WHICH IS CURRENTLY IN DEVELOPMENT, IS A FOLLOW-ON TO THE PERSHING 1a WHICH WAS FIRST DEPLOYED IN 1969. THE P1a's LAUNCHERS WOULD BE MODIFIED TO ACCEPT THE PII MISSILE WHICH WOULD HAVE LONGER RANGE, HIGHER ACCURACY AND BETTER SURVIVABILITY.

THE GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE (GLCM) SYSTEM IS THE TOMAHAWK CRUISE MISSILE ADAPTED FOR A GROUND LAUNCH. IT IS A LIGHTWEIGHT, WINGED, SELF-NAVIGATING VEHICLE POWERED BY A SMALL TURBOFAN ENGINE.

	I.O.C.	RANGE (KM)	TIME OF FLIGHT 1/	RATIO OF ACCURACY 3/	WEAPONS LOAD	MOBILE	RELOAD
SS-20	1977	4400	20 MIN. APPROX	10-11	3 MIRV's, VARIABLE YIELD	YES	YES
PII	MID 1980s (?)	OVER 1000	10 MIN. APPROX	1	1 WARHEAD, VARIABLE YIELD	YES	YES
GLCM	MID 1980s (?)	OVER 2000	VARIABLE 2/	2-3	1 WARHEAD, VARIABLE YIELD	YES	NO 4/

1/ NOMINAL TIME FROM LAUNCH TO IMPACT AT MAXIMUM RANGE.

2/ GLCMs MAXIMUM SPEED IS .75 MACH. AND ITS TIME OF FLIGHT WOULD BE HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON ITS FLIGHT PATTERN. MAXIMUM TIME OF FLIGHT = 4 HRS.

3/ PII IS APPROXIMATELY TWO TO THREE TIMES MORE ACCURATE THAN GLCMs AND TEN TO ELEVEN TIMES MORE ACCURATE THAN THE SS-20.

4/ WHILE GLCM's DO HAVE A RELOAD CAPABILITY, CURRENT PROGRAMS DO NOT ENVISION PROCUREMENT OF RELOAD MISSILES.

FACT SHEET FOR SELECTED LONG RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- AIRCRAFT

THE SOVIET UNION'S BACKFIRE B (BACKFIRE A IS A PROTOTYPE, FIRST OBSERVED IN 1970) IS A VARIABLE WING, TWIN-JET BOMBER. BACKFIRE IS DESIGNED FOR SUBSONIC CRUISE WITH UNSWEPT WINGS, THEN SEA-LEVEL PENETRATION WITH WINGS SWEPT FOR SURVIVABILITY.

THE UNITED STATES' F-111 IS A SUPERSONIC, VARIABLE-WING, ALL WEATHER FIGHTER/BOMBER CAPABLE OF DELIVERING WEAPONS WITH HIGH SURVIVABILITY.

	I.O.C.	COMBAT RADIUS (KM)	MAX SPEED SEA LEVEL (MACH)	MAX SPEED OPTIMUM ALT (MACH)	WEAPONS LOAD 2/
BACKFIRE B	1974	4200	UNDER MACH. 1	OVER MACH. 2	4, VARIABLE YIELD
F-111	1969	1800	OVER MACH. 1	OVER MACH. 2	2, VARIABLE YIELD

1/ ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTIVE COMBAT RADIUS OF AN AIRCRAFT ARE HIGHLY DEPENDENT UPON THE ASSUMPTION MADE ABOUT THE FLIGHT PROFILE FOR A PARTICULAR MISSION. FOR THE SOVIET AIRCRAFT, A HIGH-LOW-HIGH PROFILE FOR A NUCLEAR MISSION IS ASSUMED. FOR THE F-111, A HIGH-LOW-LOW-HIGH IS ASSUMED. ALL AIRCRAFT ARE ASSUMED TO RETURN TO HOME BASE; A MORE LIKELY PROFILE FOR A NUCLEAR MISSION FOR BOTH UK- AND SOVIET- BASED AIRCRAFT MIGHT BE TO LEAVE HOME BASE WITH AUXILLIARY FUEL TANKS, DELIVER WEAPONS AND RETURN TO NEAREST FRIENDLY AIR BASE. THIS COMBAT RANGE WOULD ENHANCE SIGNIFICANTLY THE NUMBER OF ENEMY TARGETS WITHIN RANGE.

2/ THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS IS BASED UPON A CONFIGURATION THAT ASSUMES THAT NUCLEAR WARHEADS WILL BE CARRIED ONLY WITH SPECIAL HANDLING EQUIPMENT. A PRE-ARMED NUCLEAR BOMB CAN BE CARRIED ANYWHERE THAT A CONVENTIONAL ONE CAN BE BUT ONLY SPECIAL HANDLING EQUIPMENT ALLOWS THE PILOT TO WAIT AND ACTIVATE THE BOMB OVER ENEMY TERRITORY.

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PACKAGE OF Q'S AND A'S CONCERNING TNF MODERNIZATION/ARMS CONTROL

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A. Mission and Rationale for TNF Modernization

1. Q. Is LRTNF modernization necessary just because the Soviets are doing it, or is there some doctrinal reason for LRTNF modernization?

A. NATO's basic strategy is one of flexible response. To implement this strategy, NATO requires a wide range of options: conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic -- all linked to pose the threat of unacceptable costs to, and therefore deterring, our potential enemies. LRTNF is and has been a critical part of that strategy. To deter aggression, NATO must both have and be perceived to have the capability to respond appropriately and to escalate if necessary -- thus demonstrating to the enemy the risks and costs of continuing the conflict. The potential challenge to NATO's strategy posed by Soviet LRTNF deployments has caused NATO to consider an evolutionary program of LRTNF modernization.

2. Q. Doesn't this modernization, in fact, create a new role -- one previously reserved to US strategic forces -- for NATO TNF to strike the Soviet Union?

A. No. NATO has long maintained forces capable of conducting nuclear strikes against the territory of the Soviet Union. Rather, TNF modernization would contribute to deterrence by deploying LRTNF having greater survivability and capability and by demonstrating the Alliance's will to meet the challenge of the Soviet buildup.

3. Q. What exactly is the mission of NATO's LRTNF and how could the capabilities of cruise missiles and Pershing IIs contribute to this mission?

A. The mission of LRTNF in NATO's strategy of flexible response is to promote deterrence by providing a wide range of options -- i.e., the capacity to respond appropriately to any kind of potential Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack. A mix of cruise missiles and ballistic missiles would confront the Warsaw Pact planner with a number of problems, which could convince him that NATO forces are capable of carrying out the flexible response strategy. The new systems would provide greater assurance of penetrating Soviet territory and will be mobile, thereby enhancing survivability. The systems could be employed either selectively or in a general nuclear response.

4. Q. If deterrence were to fail, how would LRTNF help to defend Europe and prevent the aggressor from achieving his goals?

A. While we procure weapons systems for the maintenance of deterrence, our forces must also demonstrate real military capability both to reinforce deterrence and, should deterrence fail, to prevent the aggressor from realizing his goals. In the case of NATO LRTNF, we believe that the improved capability and survivability will require the Warsaw Pact forces, to the full depth of the theater, to operate in less than optimum configurations. In addition, selective strikes by our modernized LRTNF against key logistics and transportation nodes, as

well as other military targets, could deprive the Warsaw Pact forces of the momentum which their doctrine seems to require.

5. Q. Won't LRTNF modernization simply lower the nuclear threshold and increase the likelihood of nuclear war in Europe?

A. No. In the first place, the predominant function of LRTNF is to strengthen deterrence by providing additional TNF options to complement conventional forces, short-range TNF and strategic capabilities. Such an LRTNF capability raises the nuclear threshold by lessening the possibility that the Soviets might miscalculate that they could win the war by using their theater nuclear weapons against Europe without putting Soviet territory at risk. Such a Soviet act would be a serious miscalculation because the US strategic deterrent is inextricably linked to Western European defense and the existence and survivability of a long-range theater nuclear capability based in Europe would lessen any chance of such a miscalculation. Thus, a credible NATO LRTNF capability serves to raise the nuclear threshold by increasing the risks and costs associated with any use of nuclear weapons by a potential aggressor.

6. Q. Does the LRTNF modernization program mean that NATO is increasing its reliance on nuclear as opposed to conventional forces?

A. No, it does not. NATO has always included nuclear options -- both short-range as well as long-range --as part of

its flexible response strategy. Until the Soviet Union undertook its LRTNF buildup, the balance at this level was stable and appeared to satisfy both NATO's and the Warsaw Pact's defensive purposes. Soviet deployments plus the aging of NATO systems have led the Alliance to consider modernizing its own LRTNF capabilities. We plan only to maintain our deterrent capabilities in the face of a changing situation, not increase our reliance on any particular type of capability. NATO's policy places the highest priority on continuing to improve its conventional forces; this commitment will not be affected by any LRTNF modernization program.

7. Q. Assuming the validity of your rationale for TNF modernization, doesn't NATO's flexible response strategy and the role of the TNF within it --in the context of Warsaw Pact conventional superiority -- necessitate that the West initiate the use of nuclear weapons?

A. The principal function of NATO's military capabilities is to deter acts of aggression at all levels and, furthermore, if deterrence fails at any level, to prevent the continuation of aggression by posing unacceptable risks to the enemy. The Warsaw Pact must understand that NATO conventional and nuclear forces are linked, that any act of aggression risks the use of all NATO weapons, including U.S. intercontinental forces.

B. Analysis of Trends in Soviet and NATO LRTNF

8. Q. Why is your analysis of NATO and Soviet long-range theater nuclear forces limited only to IRBMs

and aircraft such as the Backfire and F-111? Aren't there a number of other Soviet systems which are capable of delivering nuclear weapons against targets in Western Europe?

A. Any discussion of comparative theater nuclear balances runs into definitional problems in differentiating long-range from short-range nuclear systems. It is certainly true that there are a number of weapons systems not included in this analysis that can perform nuclear missions. An example would be the Soviet Fencer aircraft, a nuclear-capable aircraft with a radius of about 1000 KM. The Soviet Union has deployed somewhat over two hundred of these aircraft in the Soviet Union which under certain combat conditions can reach considerable distances into Western Europe. Any prudent planner must consider these systems as well.

9. Q. What has been past NATO policy on TNF modernization?

A. NATO's policy on TNF modernization has been that of evolutionary modernization. NATO never has advocated radical increases in theater nuclear capabilities. Rather, the policy has been to replace and update as necessary to ensure that NATO's TNF can maintain its role as one facet of the spectrum of deterrence.

10. Q. What is it about recent developments in Soviet deployments that is cause for such great alarm?

A. The Soviets are deploying an increasing number of modernized systems capable of striking Western Europe which

are far more effective than the older systems they replace or supplement. These newer systems, specifically the SS-20 missile and the Backfire bomber, have greater range, accuracy and mobility, thus allowing them to strike into Western Europe with a higher probability of mission success. Furthermore, these systems can carry a substantially greater number of nuclear warheads.

11. Q. Why aren't NATO's current LRTNF capabilities sufficient to counter the Soviet deployments of SS-20s and Backfires?

A. Current LRTNF capabilities consist of UK Vulcan and US F-111s. UK Polaris SLBMs and some US Poseidon SLBMs are also committed to NATO in the event of crisis. While the sea-based systems are highly survivable they are not as accurate as land-based missile systems and thus not as capable of performing selective strikes against military targets. NATO's land-based systems are aging (the Vulcan is soon to be retired) and increasingly vulnerable, particularly with the deployments of the SS-20 which is considerably more accurate than the SS-4 or SS-5. An LRTNF modernization program by NATO involving land-based missile systems would diversify NATO's LRTNF response options.

12. Q. Why are the Soviets deploying the SS-20 and Backfire bomber?

A. Of course, we really can't answer that question. The balance of TNF between the Soviet Union and NATO appeared to be reasonably stable until the recent Soviet buildup. Their present LRTNF deployment, however, changes the balance and provides, through increased mobility, accuracy, and number of weapons, an enhanced Soviet offensive capability. It is this recent development that is cause for concern.

13. Q. How reliable are your estimates of Soviet LRTNF capabilities? How do we really know that they are in fact increasing the numbers and capabilities of their LRTNF systems?

A. We are confident that our estimates based on intelligence assessments are accurate.

14. Q. Why has NATO allowed the Soviet Union to gain a lead in LRTNF?

A. NATO has never had a policy of matching the Soviet Union LRTNF system-for-system or warhead-for-warhead, so the question of a simple numerical "lead" is not the critical issue. What is important is that NATO continue, as it has in the past, to provide forces -- LRTNF and the rest of the range of conventional and nuclear capabilities -- to ensure that deterrence is preserved and that the Soviets cannot use the threat of military force as an effective instrument of policy in Europe. It is in this context that LRTNF modernization is being considered.

C. Arms Race and Arms Control Implications of TNF Modernization

15. Q. Why should NATO, after the US and the Soviet Union reached a new SALT agreement, seek to move into an entirely new arms race with the Soviet Union?

A. If the result of NATO's modernization of its long-range theater nuclear forces were to be an arms race, it would indeed be unfortunate and completely uncalled for on the part of the Soviet Union. Until recently both NATO and the Soviet Union maintained relatively stable LRTNF and it is the recent Soviet modernization and deployment program that is causing concern. NATO believes it must, for its own security, respond to these developments. In doing so we wish only to correct an emerging asymmetry in the two force structures. We see no need to match the projected Soviet deployments but we must maintain credible options to preserve deterrence and to be able to respond effectively in a crisis. If the Soviet Union is willing to join us in promoting stability through arms control, we are ready to do so.

16. Q. What will NATO do if the Soviet response to its LRTNF modernization is simply to increase the number of SS-20s it deploys or not retire SS-4s and SS-5s at the current rate? Or even deploy some forward based systems of their own -- for example, SS-20s in Cuba?

A. NATO is responding to a Soviet deployment program -- one which they cannot deny -- that is occurring in the face of a static NATO force posture with respect to LRTNF. We must

ensure the credibility of our TNF options. The Soviets could respond by keeping their older systems or expanding their LRTNF deployments. If they do, NATO would have to reconsider the scope of its own modernization program. In parallel, however, we will be be prepared to seek through arms control negotiations on LRTNF to constrain potential Soviet deployments, thus contributing to future stability in Europe. As for the possibility that the Soviets might station SS-20s in Cuba, such an action would be politically reckless given the history of US-Soviet agreements on nuclear offensive systems deployed in Cuba.

17. Q. Didn't the US withdraw Thor and Jupiter missiles from Europe as a result of a US-USSR agreement in connection with the Cuban missile crisis? How will this affect any new US deployments at this time?

A. The US made no agreement with the Soviet Union concerning deployment of US LRTNF in Europe in connection with the Cuban missile crisis. US withdrawal of medium-range missiles from Europe in 1963 was carried out as a result of normal force modernization decisions -- more vulnerable and less accurate systems were replaced with more capable intercontinental systems. During and after the crisis, the US consistently rejected Soviet claims that missiles be withdrawn from Turkey in exchange for Soviet withdrawal of missiles from Cuba.

18. Q. Would it be better to see if arms control for LRTNF could succeed before beginning LRTNF modernization?

A. As you know, the statement of principles included in the SALT II agreement opens the way for US and Soviet negotiations on nuclear systems not constrained by SALT II provisions. The United States has stated its position that any future limitations on US systems principally designed for theater missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theater systems. In terms of the Alliance LRTNF modernization decisions, we need to go ahead. Realistically, it is highly unlikely that the Soviet Union would accept meaningful constraints on their systems in the absence of real programs and the demonstrated public and political resolve on the part of NATO to respond to the Soviet buildup. Otherwise, they would have no incentive to engage in serious negotiations. In addition, since the Soviets have already modernized substantial portions of their long-range TNF, some NATO modernization will be necessary even if arms control efforts are successful.

19. Q. If TNF modernization is "required," how can arms control lessen the need for some modernization?

A. NATO's LRTNF is aging. For example, the British Vulcan bombers will soon be retired. Even if the Soviets had not modernized their LRTNF we would be considering the modernization of our own LRTNF. At the same time, however, the Soviet Union has changed the balance of forces at the LRTNF

level with the introduction of the SS-20 missile and Backfire bomber. The size and scope of NATO's modernization could be affected, of course, by the level of the Soviet LRTNF build-up and by the willingness of the Soviet Union to engage in meaningful arms control negotiations. We intend to pursue this subject seriously. Realistically, we do not expect the outcome of arms control negotiations to eliminate the need for some NATO TNF modernization.

20. Q. Are the plans for the introduction of modernized systems simply "bargaining chips" for future arms limitation talks?

A. The size and characteristics of NATO's TNF modernization program have not yet been determined and could be affected by the course of arms limitation talks. Such modernization cannot be viewed as "bargaining chips" in any sense of the term.

21. Q. How will the provisions of SALT II, assuming that it is ratified by the US Senate with no changes, affect NATO's program for LRTNF modernization/arms control?

A. SALT II puts no limitations on options of current interest for LRTNF modernization. The Protocol to SALT II (which bans deployment, but not testing, of long-range ground and sea-launched cruise missiles) expires on a fixed date, Dec. 31, 1981, which would be before any LRTNF deployments could occur.

22. Q. Given the magnitude of current and projected SS-20 and Backfire deployments, wouldn't any feasible arms control agreement simply freeze NATO into a position of inferiority with respect to LRTNFs?

A. In order to strengthen the NATO deterrent, it is necessary that NATO have sufficient LRTNF to provide credible options of defense and deterrence to respond to Soviet LRTNF capabilities. For this purpose, we do not need to match Soviet deployments on a one-for-one basis. At the same time, however, we will not agree to any limitation of NATO's LRTNFs that is not equitable and that would leave us with capabilities that are not sufficient to meet our defensive needs.

23. Q. If NATO has indeed committed itself to the pursuit of arms control agreements covering LRTNFs, will it be through SALT III talks or MBFR talks? If through SALT, how will NATO Allies participate in the negotiations?

A. The United States undertakes the closest possible consultations with its NATO Allies on all questions concerning TNF modernization/arms control. Through what forum, and the precise form that Alliance consultation will take, has not yet been decided and is itself a matter for Alliance choice.

24. Q. How can we increase LRTNF with Option III on the table in MBFR? Does this spell the end of the West's MBFR negotiating position?

A. The fact that we have made the Option III offer can be taken as in no way constraining the West until such time as

both sides reach an MBFR agreement on the substance of that offer. NATO is in the process of deciding the substance of its entire LRTNF modernization and related arms control recommendations, and decisions in these areas are not hampered by current negotiations in MBFR.

25. Q. After signing the SALT II agreement in Vienna, President Carter told Congress that if SALT II were not ratified, NATO defense would be hurt by a diversion of US resources from strengthening NATO capabilities to an unrestricted strategic arms race with the Soviet Union. Is this true?

A. As you know, our NATO Allies have strongly endorsed SALT II as serving the interests of the NATO Alliance. We do not expect, however, that it will be rejected, and in any case, the United States' commitment to European defense will remain firm.

26. Q. The Soviet Union has no nuclear weapons, unconstrained by SALT, which are capable of attacking the US. Why does the US seek to circumvent the intent of SALT by deploying new strategic systems into the European continent?

A. The terms of SALT II are quite explicit as to which systems are constrained and which are not. The US (and NATO) has absolutely no intent or interest in circumventing the terms of the treaty. The Soviet Union has deployed in the Soviet Union sizeable numbers of ballistic missiles (SS-20s, SS-4s, and SS-5s) and bombers (Backfire, Badger and Blinder) against Western Europe. These forces, unconstrained by any

agreement (except for production limits on Backfire) cannot be ignored. If the Alliance decides to modernize its LRTNF, it will be to reinforce NATO strategy and to respond to Soviet LRTNF modernization, and will not circumvent the limits in SALT II.

D. On the Impact of LRTNF Modernization upon the "Coupling" of US Strategic Deterrence to Western European Defense

27. Q. Is it meaningful to talk about the "Euro-Strategic balance?"

A. Any discussion of the balance of nuclear forces in the European theater must consider US and Soviet intercontinental capabilities. A basic component of the NATO deterrent is its inextricable link to US intercontinental forces. To consider LRTNF balances without including the US/USSR intercontinental balance is to neglect an essential element in this area.

28. Q. Doesn't the existence of strategic parity -- together with the increasing vulnerability of US land-based strategic forces -- reduce the likelihood that the US will respond to major Warsaw Pact provocations in Western Europe -- a likelihood that would be further reduced if NATO provides itself with a minimal assured destruction capability through LRTNF modernization?

A. NATO's LRTNF modernization program does not in any sense represent an attempt to procure a European-based minimal assured destruction capability. To do so might tempt a potential aggressor into the misperception that the United States might possibly remain uninvolved in a general European nuclear war. This would be a grave miscalculation since the cornerstone of

US policy is its commitment to European defense. NATO's LRTNF modernization program has as one of its principal purposes the continuing provision of credible LRTNF options so as to prevent any possible miscalculation by the Soviets about whether a European-based conflict could be contained without risk of escalating to general nuclear war -- a purpose central to NATO's continuum of deterrence.

29. Q. Does the stationing of cruise and ballistic missiles in Europe presage the decoupling of the US strategic arsenal from the defense of Europe?

A. On the contrary, NATO's LRTNF program in no way should be interpreted as contributing to any "decoupling" of US intercontinental forces from European defense. The security of the United States is indivisible from the security of Western Europe and US intercontinental forces remain firmly linked to the defense of Europe. A principal reason for the proposed deployments of LRTNF is to make this linkage clear to the Soviet Union -- to correct any possible misperception on their part that they could initiate a war which would be confined to Europe, leaving US and Soviet territory as sanctuaries.

E. <u>On European Acceptance of TNF, both Public and Governmental</u>

30. Q. Won't the stationing of these new nuclear weapons simply make new targets out of European countries if a nuclear war occurs?

A. Any LRTNF modernization program would be designed to preserve and enhance the deterrence -- that is, to prevent war from ever beginning.

31. Q. Why should Europeans endorse additional deployments of nuclear weapons in Europe when all that will do is ensure higher levels of destruction for them if they are drawn into a superpower war?

A. Obviously we are all aware of the horrendous destruction which would result from any general nuclear war. Unfortunately it is one of the ironies of the nuclear era that in order to deter war and aggression -- the prime purpose of the NATO Alliance -- we must often increase the costs to the enemy (and us) associated with war if deterrence fails. Despite the existence of massive destructive power from nuclear weapons, this logic of deterrence remains compelling and continues to help preserve peace in Europe, as it has for the past 30 years.

32. Q. Wouldn't the national security interest of all the smaller NATO nations be best served by their excluding new long-range theater nuclear weapons from their soil?

A. The foundation upon which NATO is built is the premise that the national security interests of member states is best served by addressing these interests as an Alliance. The cohesiveness and solidarity of the Alliance is predicated on the willingness of each of its member states to share appropriately in the risks and burdens associated with maintaining the security of the Alliance -- a security that all states enjoy, large or small.

F. Justification for Actual Package - Those Who Argue Not Enough or Too Much

33. Q. In a recent article, Richard Burt reports that the United States will soon propose the deployment in Western Europe of between 200 and 600 nuclear warheads with increased capabilities (such as the PII) to counter the Soviets' SS-20 and Backfire systems. Is this true?

A. Soviet LRTNF deployments -- which include SS-20 and Backfire -- necessitate an appropriate response from NATO in terms of LRTNF modernization. The precise size and characteristics of the modernization program have not yet been determined by the Alliance.

34. Q. Assuming that the reported range of 200-600 deliverable warheads is correct, why aren't we deploying more LRTNF systems to meet the projected threat posed by SS-20 and Backfire deployments which by 1985 could increase by between 200 and 300 percent?

A. The nature of NATO's LRTNF modernization program has not yet been determined but the intention of our modernization program, in any event, is not to match the Soviet Union missile-for-missile, warhead-for-warhead. NATO's principal purpose in LRTNF modernization is to provide itself with credible response options. It is not necessary for this purpose to match Soviet deployments on a one-for-one basis.

35. Q. Accepting for the moment that NATO needs additional LRTNF, we have only heard reports of systems that are land-based -- that is, PIIs and GLCMs. Why wouldn't it be more appropriately sea-based -- thus providing greater survivability, reducing Soviet incentives to use nuclear weapons against Europe and avoiding the political difficulties of arranging national bases?

A. NATO has, and will continue to have, a significant portion of its LRTNF capability deployed at sea. New land-based systems with good pre-launch survivability will greatly diversify NATO's LRTNF, thus enhancing the credibility of LRTNF response options. Land-basing in the different allied countries convincingly and visibly conveys the vitality, cohesiveness, and solidarity of the NATO Alliance.

36. Q. I simply don't understand how proliferating still more nuclear weapons will improve the security of Western Europe. If the tens of thousands of existing nuclear weapons cannot deter the Soviets how can we expect a few hundred more in Europe to deter them?

A. Deterrence is not established or maintained by some simple counting of nuclear weapons. NATO strategic doctrine recognizes that deterrence depends on what types of actions are intended to be deterred and the credibility of actually employing the forces if deterrence fails. We believe that the proposed improvements to NATO's LRTNF will strengthen the deterrence well beyond their numerical contribution by their demonstration of NATO's will to respond.